New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation
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Publication:2247950
DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0731-5zbMath1291.91146OpenAlexW2077321147WikidataQ59972703 ScholiaQ59972703MaRDI QIDQ2247950
Publication date: 30 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_575.pdf
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Cites Work
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