Recommendations
Cites work
- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
- Distributive justice in taxation
- ERRATUM: "BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION"
- Fair Income Tax
- Group order preservation and the proportional rule for the adjudication of conflicting claims
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3659914 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems
- New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule
- Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations
- On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
- On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency
- On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method
- On the equivalence between progressive taxation and inequality reduction
- Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims
- Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness
- Tax progression and inequality of income distribution
- The Effect of Transformations of Lorenz Curves
- The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems.
Cited in
(19)- Laissez-faire or full redistribution?
- A sequential partition method for non-cooperative games of bankruptcy problems
- Inequality minimising subsidy and taxation
- Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems
- Bilateral redistribution
- New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
- Rationing in the presence of baselines
- Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems
- Mathematical aspects of degressive proportionality
- A note on passepartout problems
- Refining the Lorenz‐ranking of rules for claims problems on restricted domains
- Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split
- Non-proportional inequality preservation in gains and losses
- Constrained dictatorial rules are subject to variable-population paradoxes
- Popular support for progressive taxation
- Induced rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems: towards merge-proofness and coalitional stability
- The probability smoothing problem: characterizations of the Laplace method
- Claims manipulations discriminate between egalitarian rules
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