Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0159-2zbMATH Open1134.91382OpenAlexW2106227664MaRDI QIDQ866940FDOQ866940

Authors: Murat Atlamaz, Bettina Klaus 

Publication date: 14 February 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2004/59804.pdf

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• On cores and indivisibility
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
• Voting by Committees
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Manipulation via Endowments
• Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good
• Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
• Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
• Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment

Cited In (16)

• Incentives in landing slot problems
• The \(n\)-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations
• On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation
• Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
• Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
• Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
• On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules
• Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
• Endogenous market integration, manipulation and limits to arbitrage
• Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods
• Allocation rules are very generally vulnerable to the strategic withholding of endowments
• Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
• Strategic Manipulation in a Society with Indivisible Goods
• Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information
• Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences

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