Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0159-2MaRDI QIDQ866940zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Murat Atlamaz, Bettina Klaus

Publication date 14 February 2007

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2004/59804.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
• Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
• Manipulation via Endowments
• On cores and indivisibility
• Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
• Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Voting by Committees

Cited in

(16)

• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
• Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
• Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods
• Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
• Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences
• Incentives in landing slot problems
• Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods
• Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information
• Endogenous market integration, manipulation and limits to arbitrage
• Strategic Manipulation in a Society with Indivisible Goods
• On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules
• The \(n\)-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations
• Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
• Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
• On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation
• Allocation rules are very generally vulnerable to the strategic withholding of endowments

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