Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- On cores and indivisibility
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
- Restricted housewapping games
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(25)- Hierarchical allocation
- Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
- Matching with ownership
- Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
- Mechanisms for trading durable goods
- Matching with restricted trade
- Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies
- Strategic Manipulation in a Society with Indivisible Goods
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange under conditionally lexicographic preferences
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods
- Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses
- Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
- Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
- Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies
- Non-bossiness
- Booster draft mechanisms for multi-object assignment
- Efficiency in multiple-type housing markets
- Axiomatic characterizations of draft rules
- Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
- Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
- Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
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