A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange under Conditionally Lexicographic Preferences

DOI10.1613/jair.1.11254zbMath1454.91105OpenAlexW2903177238WikidataQ128873791 ScholiaQ128873791MaRDI QIDQ4558795

Makoto Yokoo, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Akihisa Sonoda, Julien Lesca

Publication date: 30 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.11254

zbMATH Keywords

resource allocationmechanism designlexicographic preferencesaugmented top-trading-cyclescore-selecting exchange

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (7)

Pareto Optimal Matchings in Many-to-Many Markets with Ties ⋮ Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas ⋮ Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties ⋮ Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences ⋮ A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences

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