A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange under conditionally lexicographic preferences

DOI10.1613/JAIR.1.11254MaRDI QIDQ4558795zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo

Publication date 30 November 2018

Published in Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.11254

zbMATH Keywords

augmented top-trading-cyclescore-selecting exchangelexicographic preferencesmechanism designresource allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cited in

(10)

• Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
• A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
• Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
• Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
• Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
• Reasoning about social choice and games in monadic fixed-point logic
• Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
• Reallocation mechanisms under distributional constraints in the full preference domain
• Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies
• One-sided markets with externalities

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