A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange under conditionally lexicographic preferences

DOI10.1613/JAIR.1.11254zbMATH Open1454.91105OpenAlexW2903177238WikidataQ128873791 ScholiaQ128873791MaRDI QIDQ4558795FDOQ4558795

Authors: Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo 

Publication date: 30 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.11254

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zbMATH Keywords

resource allocationlexicographic preferencesmechanism designaugmented top-trading-cyclescore-selecting exchange

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cited In (9)

• Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
• Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
• Reallocation mechanisms under distributional constraints in the full preference domain
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
• Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
• Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies
• Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
• Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties

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