Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.12.004zbMATH Open1458.91106OpenAlexW3113770744MaRDI QIDQ1995476FDOQ1995476

Ghufran Ahmad

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatibilityhousing markettop trading cyclesweak preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• On cores and indivisibility
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• House allocation with existing tenants
• Kidney Exchange
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
• Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
• Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
• The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
• A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange under Conditionally Lexicographic Preferences

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