Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
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Publication:719868
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.005zbMath1236.91106OpenAlexW2109476669MaRDI QIDQ719868
Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Elena Molis
Publication date: 12 October 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2454/18593
Trade models (91B60) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (24)
On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets ⋮ The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home? ⋮ Mechanisms for trading durable goods ⋮ Two-sided matching with indifferences ⋮ Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods ⋮ The top‐trading cycles and chains solution for kidney exchange with immunosuppressants ⋮ Multi resource allocation with partial preferences ⋮ Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf ⋮ Stability of an allocation of objects ⋮ Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient? ⋮ Pareto optimality in coalition formation ⋮ The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects ⋮ Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values ⋮ Matching with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation ⋮ Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences ⋮ Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange ⋮ Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited ⋮ Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences ⋮ An impossibility result for housing markets with fractional endowments ⋮ A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties ⋮ Influence in private-goods allocation ⋮ Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses
Cites Work
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Random assignment under weak preferences
- An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- House allocation with existing tenants
- On cores and indivisibility
- Kidney Exchange
- Depth-First Search and Linear Graph Algorithms
- On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
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