Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:719868
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.005zbMath1236.91106MaRDI QIDQ719868
Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Elena Molis
Publication date: 12 October 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2454/18593
91B60: Trade models
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
91B68: Matching models
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