On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
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Publication:2138378
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2022.102637zbMATH Open1490.91107arXiv2004.09075OpenAlexW4206773407MaRDI QIDQ2138378FDOQ2138378
Authors: Yanyan Li 
Publication date: 11 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We study the welfare consequences of merging Shapley--Scarf markets. Market integration can lead to large welfare losses and make the vast majority of agents worse-off, but is on average welfare-enhancing and makes all agents better off ex-ante. The number of agents harmed by integration is a minority when all markets are small or agents' preferences are highly correlated.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.09075
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Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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