Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.01.001MaRDI QIDQ2347788zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Panos Toulis, David C. Parkes

Publication date 8 June 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17145148

zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatible designinteger programmingkidney exchangemaximum matchingmechanism designrandom graphs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Random graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C80) Applications of graph theory (05C90) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• Dynamic kidney exchange
• Fairness, efficiency, and flexibility in organ allocation for kidney transplantation
• Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3216216 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3225183 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mix and match: a strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
• Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• The proportional random allocation of indivisible units

Cited in

(19)

• How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange
• Social integration in two-sided matching markets
• Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values
• IP solutions for international kidney exchange programmes
• A theoretical and computational equilibria analysis of a multi-player kidney exchange program
• On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
• An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism
• Mix and match: a strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
• Randomized parameterized algorithms for the kidney exchange problem
• A Bounded-Risk Mechanism for the Kidney Exchange Game
• Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6963656 (Why is no real title available?)
• A nonasymptotic approach to analyzing kidney exchange graphs
• Identifying optimal strategies in kidney exchange games is \(\varSigma_2^p\)-complete
• A recourse policy to improve number of successful transplants in uncertain kidney exchange programs
• Designing a kidney exchange program in Germany: simulations and recommendations
• Operational research approaches and mathematical models for kidney exchange: a literature survey and empirical evaluation
• Computing balanced solutions for large international kidney exchange schemes when cycle length is unbounded
• Welfare effects of integrating unbalanced matching markets

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