The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
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Recommendations
- Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5697111
Cites work
- Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- On cores and indivisibility
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
- Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
Cited in
(11)- A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
- Allocating group housing
- Preference aggregation for couples
- Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
- On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5697111 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
- The core for housing markets with limited externalities
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
- Shapley-Scarf housing markets: respecting improvement, integer programming, and kidney exchange
- Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
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