A conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on competitive outcomes in the cores of NTU market games

DOI10.1007/BF01240130zbMATH Open0802.90133OpenAlexW2032589016WikidataQ122924888 ScholiaQ122924888MaRDI QIDQ1313360FDOQ1313360

Authors: Cheng-Zhong Qin 

Publication date: 1 February 1994

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240130

Recommendations

• Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games
• Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
• Core, value and equilibria for market games: On a problem of Aumann and Shapley
• Equivalence theorem for the core of a duopolistic market game with concave utilities
• Competitive pricing and the core: with reference to matching

zbMATH Keywords

inner corecompetitive payoff vectorsNTU market game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

• A characterization of polyhedral market games
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Competitive outcomes in the cores of market games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A further result on the representation of games by markets
• The inner core and the strictly inhibitive set

Cited In (13)

• Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs
• On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
• Selecting a unique competitive equilibrium with default penalties
• Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game
• The Walras core of an economy and its limit theorem
• Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
• Networks and Stability
• On multi-choice TU games arising from replica of economies
• Equivalence theorem for the core of a duopolistic market game with concave utilities
• Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games
• On Shapley-Shubik equilibria with financial markets
• The Nonemptiness of the Inner Core
• Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies

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