A conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on competitive outcomes in the cores of NTU market games

DOI10.1007/BF01240130MaRDI QIDQ1313360zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Cheng-Zhong Qin

Publication date 1 February 1994

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240130

zbMATH Keywords

competitive payoff vectorsinner coreNTU market game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games
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Cites work

• A characterization of polyhedral market games
• A further result on the representation of games by markets
• Competitive outcomes in the cores of market games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1194817 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3395596 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3422228 (Why is no real title available?)
• On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets
• The Core of an N Person Game
• The inner core and the strictly inhibitive set

Cited in

(16)

• Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
• Equivalence theorem for the core of a duopolistic market game with concave utilities
• Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
• Core, value and equilibria for market games: On a problem of Aumann and Shapley
• Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies
• On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
• Payoffs in exact TU economies
• On multi-choice TU games arising from replica of economies
• Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs
• The Walras core of an economy and its limit theorem
• The nonemptiness of the inner core
• Selecting a unique competitive equilibrium with default penalties
• Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games
• Networks and stability
• Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game
• On Shapley-Shubik equilibria with financial markets

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