A conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on competitive outcomes in the cores of NTU market games

DOI10.1007/BF01240130zbMath0802.90133WikidataQ122924888 ScholiaQ122924888MaRDI QIDQ1313360

Cheng-Zhong Qin

Publication date: 1 February 1994

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

inner core; competitive payoff vectors; NTU market game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91B50: General equilibrium theory

Related Items

Selecting a unique competitive equilibrium with default penalties, Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games, Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game, Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games, Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies, On multi-choice TU games arising from replica of economies, Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs, The Walras core of an economy and its limit theorem

Cites Work

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• On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets
• Competitive outcomes in the cores of market games
• A further result on the representation of games by markets
• The inner core and the strictly inhibitive set
• A characterization of polyhedral market games
• The Core of an N Person Game