An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations
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Publication:1241194
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90139-9zbMath0364.90146MaRDI QIDQ1241194
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/191.pdf
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