Stability of an allocation of objects
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Publication:6156320
DOI10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5zbMath1515.91087OpenAlexW4206818013MaRDI QIDQ6156320
Publication date: 13 June 2023
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5
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