Stability of an allocation of objects
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Publication:6156320
DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00280-5zbMATH Open1515.91087OpenAlexW4206818013MaRDI QIDQ6156320FDOQ6156320
Authors: Murat Yılmaz, Özgür Yılmaz 
Publication date: 13 June 2023
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5
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- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
- An existence theorem for a bargaining set
- On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming
- The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information
Cited In (6)
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