Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.09.002MaRDI QIDQ2222222zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuji Fujinaka, Toshiji Miyakawa

Publication date 26 January 2021

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

ex-post incentive compatibilityex-post individual rationalityhousing marketinterdependent valuesrandom assignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• An Efficient Auction
• Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• Efficient assignment with interdependent values
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
• Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
• Group stability in matching with interdependent values
• House allocation with existing tenants
• House allocation with transfers
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Incentive compatible market design with applications
• On cores and indivisibility
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(3)

• Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets
• The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
• Efficient assignment with interdependent values

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