Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Multiagent system simulations of signal averaging in English auctions with two-dimensional value signals
- Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- Pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games
- English auctions with ensuing risks and heterogeneous bidders
- Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
- Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
- The relevance of private information in mechanism design
- Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions
- Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
- Information revelation and efficiency in auctions
- Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
- Bad news can be good news: early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals
- Revenue maximizing auctions with market interaction and signaling
- Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
- Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
- On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
- Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
- The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
- Inefficiency in the shadow of unobservable reservation payoffs
- Extremism drives out moderation
- Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
- A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
- Efficiency versus optimality in procurement
- Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
- Incentives and justice for sequencing problems
- Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
- Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions
- Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
- Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
- A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations
- Implementation in an interdependent value framework
- Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
- Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning
- Auctions with interdependence and SOS: improved approximation
- Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values
- Entry deterrence and free riding in license auctions: incumbent heterogeneity and monotonicity
- Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard
- Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- Social learning and delay in a dynamic model of price competition
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
- Optimal search, learning and implementation
- Algorithms and mechanisms for procuring services with uncertain durations using redundancy
- Mechanism and network design with private negative externalities
- Dynamic mechanism design with interdependent valuations
- Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
- Efficient demand-driven evaluation. Part 2
- The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
- Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
- Informational hold up and intermediaries
- Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
- Screening while controlling an externality
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations
- Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner
- Ex-post implementation with interdependent values
- Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
- The insider's curse
- On efficiency of the English auction
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
- Second best efficiency and the English auction
- Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values
- Combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations: SOS to the rescue
- On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values
- An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities
- Efficient incentives with social preferences
- Optimal student allocation with peer effects
- Save, spend, or give? A model of housing, family insurance, and savings in old age
- Hazed and confused: the effect of air pollution on dementia
- IQ, expectations, and choice
- Optimal feedback in contests
- Unemployment insurance in macroeconomic stabilization
- A welfare analysis of occupational licensing in U.S. states
- A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
- A more credible approach to parallel trends
- Testing the production approach to markup estimation
- Stratification trees for adaptive randomisation in randomised controlled trials
- Auction design with data-driven misspecifications: inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation
- Towards data auctions with externalities
- Locally robust implementation and its limits
- Auctions with signaling bidders: optimal design and information disclosure
- Information-based discrimination
- Fair division with interdependent values
- Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
- An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
This page was built for publication: Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4531033)
