Towards data auctions with externalities

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.09.008MaRDI QIDQ6665683zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Anish Agarwal, Munther A. Dahleh, Thibaut Horel, Maryann Rui

Publication date 17 January 2025

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2024.09.008

zbMATH Keywords

data marketsexternalitiesmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Recommendations

• The economics of data externalities
• Selling information in competitive environments
• Ad auctions with data
• Competitive auctions for markets with positive externalities
• Value-Based Network Externalities and Optimal Auction Design

Cites work

• A general model of information sharing in oligopoly
• A monopolistic market for information
• Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
• Budget feasible mechanisms for experimental design
• Competitive auctions
• Direct and Indirect Sale of Information
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities
• Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games
• Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
• Mechanism and network design with private negative externalities
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Online convex optimization in the bandit setting: gradient descent without a gradient
• Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents
• Quality-based competition, profitability, and variable costs
• Selling information in competitive environments
• The complexity of optimal mechanism design

Cited in

(4)

• Regression markets and application to energy forecasting
• Selling information in competitive environments
• The value of data records
• Mechanism design for auctions with externalities on budgets

This page was built for publication: Towards data auctions with externalities

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6665683)