Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents

DOI10.3982/TE5173MaRDI QIDQ6076924zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ozan Candogan, Philipp Strack

Publication date 17 October 2023

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te5173

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasioninformation designpartitional signalsprivate information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Competition in persuasion
• Extreme Points of Moment Sets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3090557 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
• Optimal signaling of content accuracy: engagement vs. misinformation
• Persuasion in networks: public signals and cores
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Robust predictions in games with incomplete information
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• The interval structure of optimal disclosure

Cited in

(9)

• Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions
• Information acquisition in the era of fair disclosure: an application of asymmetric awareness
• Long information design
• Private disclosure with multiple agents
• Constrained Information Design
• The persuasion duality
• Towards data auctions with externalities
• Persuasion meets delegation
• To reveal or not to reveal? Strategic disclosure of private information in negotiation

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