Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms

DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01277-XMaRDI QIDQ2074049zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 4 February 2022

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01277-x

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasionmajorizationmechanism designstochastic orders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Monotone persuasion
• Private Bayesian persuasion
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• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
• Bayesian persuasion with optimal learning

Cites work

• A First Course in Order Statistics
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1134711 (Why is no real title available?)
• Inequalities for distributions with given marginals
• Inequalities: theory of majorization and its applications
• Information and the dispersion of posterior expectations
• Information revelation in competitive markets
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Informational control and organizational design
• Monotone persuasion
• Multivariate comonotonicity
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Delegation
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
• Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
• Stochastic orders
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• The optimal private information in single unit monopoly

Cited in

(12)

• Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
• Resisting persuasion
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Monotone persuasion
• Monopolistic signal provision
• Optimal signaling mechanisms in unobservable queues
• Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling
• On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
• Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents
• Optimal stress tests and liquidation cost
• Conveying value via categories
• Perfect robust implementation by private information design

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