An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities

DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01538-5MaRDI QIDQ6623770zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Tatiana Daddario, Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite

Publication date 24 October 2024

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00199-023-01538-5

zbMATH Keywords

assignment problemasymmetric informationmechanism designtwo stage mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites work

• A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
• An Efficient Auction
• Efficient assignment with interdependent values
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Game theory and mechanism design
• Implementation with interdependent valuations
• Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values

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