Implementation with interdependent valuations
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Publication:4586024
Recommendations
- Implementation in an interdependent value framework
- A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
- A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations
- Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
Cited in
(18)- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
- Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
- VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities
- Delegation principle for multi-agency games under ex post equilibrium
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
- Implementation in an interdependent value framework
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers
- A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
- On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values
- An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities
- Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction
- Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
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