Implementation with interdependent valuations

DOI10.3982/TE1440zbMath1395.91233MaRDI QIDQ4586024

Andrew Postlewaite, Richard P. McLean

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmechanism designincentive compatibilityinterdependent valuesex post incentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values ⋮ The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets ⋮ Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence ⋮ Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations ⋮ A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems ⋮ Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents ⋮ Delegation principle for multi-agency games under ex post equilibrium ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces

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