A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.06.007MaRDI QIDQ522999zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Richard McLean, Andrew Postlewaite

Publication date 20 April 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.007

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designauctionsincentive compatibilityinterdependent valuesprivacyinformational sizeex post incentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Implementation with interdependent valuations
• Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
• Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers
• Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction
• A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
• Bayesian Implementation
• Feasible and Continuous Implementation
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Implementation with interdependent valuations
• Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
• Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms

Cited in

(5)

• Implementation in an interdependent value framework
• Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
• Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
• An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities
• Implementation with interdependent valuations

This page was built for publication: A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q522999)