Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.08.008MaRDI QIDQ324173zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jacob K. Goeree, Alexey Kushnir

Publication date 10 October 2016

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.008

zbMATH Keywords

convex analysisconvex setsupport functionsocial choicemechanism designinterdependent valuesreduced-form implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Implementation in an interdependent value framework
• Implementation with interdependent valuations
• A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1266748 (Why is no real title available?)
• Asymmetric reduced form auctions
• Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation in the independent private-values model
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Generalized reduced-form auctions: a network-flow approach
• Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
• Mechanism design. A linear programming approach.
• Multidimensional mechanism design: finite-dimensional approximations and efficient computation
• On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types
• On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
• On the optimality of not allocating
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• Optimal dynamic auctions and simple index rules
• Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
• Reduced form auctions revisited
• Second best efficiency and the English auction
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• What shape is your conjugate? A survey of computational convex analysis and its applications

Cited in

(2)

• Symmetric reduced-form voting
• Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives

This page was built for publication: Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q324173)