Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.08.008zbMATH Open1394.91160OpenAlexW2517947875MaRDI QIDQ324173FDOQ324173

Authors: Jacob K. Goeree, Alexey Kushnir 

Publication date: 10 October 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.008

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zbMATH Keywords

convex analysisconvex setsupport functionsocial choicemechanism designinterdependent valuesreduced-form implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• What shape is your conjugate? A survey of computational convex analysis and its applications
• On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
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• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
• Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms
• Optimal dynamic auctions and simple index rules
• On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types
• Generalized reduced-form auctions: a network-flow approach
• Asymmetric reduced form auctions
• Second best efficiency and the English auction
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Reduced form auctions revisited
• Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines

Cited In (2)

• Symmetric reduced-form voting
• Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives

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