Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.008zbMath1394.91160OpenAlexW2517947875MaRDI QIDQ324173

Jacob K. Goeree, Alexey Kushnir

Publication date: 10 October 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.008

zbMATH Keywords

convex setsocial choiceconvex analysismechanism designsupport functioninterdependent valuesreduced-form implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types
• Asymmetric reduced form auctions
• Second best efficiency and the English auction
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Reduced form auctions revisited
• Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
• On the optimality of not allocating
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation
• Bayesian and Dominant-Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private-Values Model
• Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Finite-Dimensional Approximations and Efficient Computation
• What Shape Is Your Conjugate? A Survey of Computational Convex Analysis and Its Applications
• On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
• Efficient Auctions
• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
• Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms
• Optimal Dynamic Auctions and Simple Index Rules
• Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: A Network-Flow Approach
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

This page was built for publication: Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies