Implementation in an interdependent value framework
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Publication:2452816
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.01.002zbMath1291.91086MaRDI QIDQ2452816
Publication date: 5 June 2014
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.01.002
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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Cites Work
- An optimal auction for complements
- Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good
- Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
- Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
- The Limits of ex post Implementation
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Optimal Auction Design
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- An Efficient Auction