Implementation in an interdependent value framework

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2014.01.002MaRDI QIDQ2452816zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Levent Ülkü

Publication date 5 June 2014

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.01.002

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Implementation with interdependent valuations
• Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials
• Ex post implementation
• A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
• The Limits of ex post Implementation

Cites work

• An Efficient Auction
• An optimal auction for complements
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
• Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• The Limits of ex post Implementation

Cited in

(4)

• Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
• Implementation with interdependent valuations
• Ex-post implementation with interdependent values
• Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials

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