Ex-post implementation with interdependent values

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.09.002MaRDI QIDQ6188260zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Saurav Goyal, Aroon Narayanan

Publication date 11 January 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.09580

zbMATH Keywords

eventual monotonicityex-post implementationinterdependent value auctionoptimal auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Abstract: We characterize ex-post implementable allocation rules for single object auctions under quasi-linear preferences with convex interdependent value functions. We show that requiring ex-post implementability is equivalent to requiring that the allocation rule must satisfy a condition that we call eventual monotonicity (EM), which is a weakening of monotonicity, a familiar condition used to characterize dominant strategy implementation.

Recommendations

• Ex post implementation
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• The Limits of ex post Implementation
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• Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Implementation in an interdependent value framework
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
• The Limits of ex post Implementation

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