On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions

DOI10.2307/1913517zbMath0594.90020OpenAlexW1987745142MaRDI QIDQ3725830

Steven A. Matthews

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/560.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

implementabilityoptimal n-bidder auctionsreduced form auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

Related Items (13)

Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies ⋮ Reduced form auctions revisited ⋮ Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives ⋮ Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition ⋮ Asymmetric reduced form auctions ⋮ Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms ⋮ Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments ⋮ Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines ⋮ Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers ⋮ Optimization and mechanism design ⋮ Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments

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