Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.03.002zbMATH Open1417.91243OpenAlexW2925212247MaRDI QIDQ2425156FDOQ2425156

Authors: Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent 

Publication date: 26 June 2019

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.002

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zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian incentive compatibilitymulti-dimensional mechanism designdominant strategy incentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
• On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
• Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
• Reduced form auctions revisited
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (1)

• Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation in the independent private-values model

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