Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.03.002MaRDI QIDQ2425156zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent

Publication date 26 June 2019

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian incentive compatibilitymulti-dimensional mechanism designdominant strategy incentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3671967 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3673817 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3441084 (Why is no real title available?)
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Reduced form auctions revisited
• The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations

Cited in

(2)

• Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation in the independent private-values model
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and deterministic dominant strategy implementation

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