scientific article
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3869041
zbMath0431.90006MaRDI QIDQ3869041
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Eric S. Maskin
Publication date: 1979
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
public goodscollective decision-makingincentive compatibilitydominant strategiesfree rider problemmisrepresentation of preferencesdifferential approachtruth revelationeconomic choice mechanismexpected utility maximizing mechanisms
Related Items (15)
Balanced Bayesian mechanisms ⋮ Robust trading mechanisms ⋮ Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ Bargaining with learning ⋮ Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments ⋮ Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms ⋮ Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs ⋮ Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality ⋮ Interim third-party selection in bargaining ⋮ Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading ⋮ Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects ⋮ Pollution claim settlements under private information ⋮ Provision of public goods in a large economy ⋮ A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation ⋮ Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
This page was built for publication:
