A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
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Publication:1294103
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0663zbMath0926.91014OpenAlexW2059080121MaRDI QIDQ1294103
Publication date: 11 November 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0663
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