A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0663zbMath0926.91014OpenAlexW2059080121MaRDI QIDQ1294103

Taesung Kim, Jaewon Choi

Publication date: 11 November 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0663

zbMATH Keywords

nonparametricmechanismBayesianundominated Bayesian equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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