Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1255869
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(78)90047-9zbMath0402.90005OpenAlexW2055581183MaRDI QIDQ1255869
Publication date: 1978
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/82586/
PreferencesVotingSocial ChoiceIncentive CompatibleIncomplete InformationManipulationNondictatorial SchemeTrue Preferences
Related Items (13)
Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality ⋮ The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium ⋮ Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types ⋮ On robust constitution design ⋮ Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods ⋮ Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model ⋮ The robustness of robust implementation ⋮ Implementation under ambiguity ⋮ Locally robust implementation and its limits ⋮ Peter J. Hammond ⋮ Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers ⋮ The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule ⋮ A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Incentives in Planning Procedures for the Provision of Public Goods
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
This page was built for publication: Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
