On robust constitution design

DOI10.1007/S11238-006-9017-ZzbMATH Open1121.91033OpenAlexW3121552241MaRDI QIDQ885072FDOQ885072

Authors: Emmanuelle Auriol, Robert J. Gary-Bobo 

Publication date: 7 June 2007

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/2415/1/auriol.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationmechanism designrepresentative democracycollective choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition

Cited In (3)

• A theory of constitutional standards and civil liberty
• Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
• Material constitution is ad hoc

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