Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215724 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Incentives in Planning Procedures for the Provision of Public Goods
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Cited in
(13)- Locally robust implementation and its limits
- Peter J. Hammond
- Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers
- Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality
- A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
- The robustness of robust implementation
- On robust constitution design
- The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
- The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Implementation under ambiguity
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