Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers
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Publication:976966
DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0427-zzbMath1230.91086OpenAlexW1965191056MaRDI QIDQ976966
Arunava Sen, Manipushpak Mitra
Publication date: 16 June 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0427-z
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