Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers

DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0427-ZMaRDI QIDQ976966zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Manipushpak Mitra, Arunava Sen

Publication date 16 June 2010

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0427-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3887382 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
• Incentives in Teams
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• Mechanism design in queueing problems
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• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
• Robust Mechanism Design
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions

Cited in

(9)

• Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
• On slots' scheduling
• Allocating positions fairly: auctions and Shapley value
• Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
• Balanced Allocations: The Heavily Loaded Case
• Balanced ranking mechanisms
• Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
• Dominant strategy implementation in multi-unit allocation problems
• Incentives and justice for sequencing problems

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