Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers
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Publication:976966
DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0427-ZzbMATH Open1230.91086OpenAlexW1965191056MaRDI QIDQ976966FDOQ976966
Authors: Manipushpak Mitra, Arunava Sen 
Publication date: 16 June 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0427-z
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Cites Work
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- Incentives in Teams
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- Robust Mechanism Design
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Cited In (9)
- On slots' scheduling
- Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
- Allocating positions fairly: auctions and Shapley value
- Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
- Balanced Allocations: The Heavily Loaded Case
- Balanced ranking mechanisms
- Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
- Dominant strategy implementation in multi-unit allocation problems
- Incentives and justice for sequencing problems
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