Balanced ranking mechanisms
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Publication:2411515
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.002zbMath1415.91181arXiv1604.08379OpenAlexW2463277343MaRDI QIDQ2411515
Yan Long, Tridib Sharma, Debasis Mishra
Publication date: 24 October 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.08379
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (6)
Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects ⋮ Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers ⋮ Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms ⋮ Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects ⋮ A simple budget-balanced mechanism ⋮ Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
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