A simple budget-balanced mechanism

DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1078-0zbMath1392.91098OpenAlexW2753560347MaRDI QIDQ1707114

Debasis Mishra, Tridib Sharma

Publication date: 28 March 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1078-0

zbMATH Keywords

resource allocationbudget-balanced mechanismsingle object auction model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items

Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains

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