A simple budget-balanced mechanism
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Publication:1707114
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1078-0zbMath1392.91098OpenAlexW2753560347MaRDI QIDQ1707114
Publication date: 28 March 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1078-0
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cites Work
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