Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects

DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1102-4zbMath1391.91113OpenAlexW2783101624MaRDI QIDQ1638035

Yan Long

Publication date: 12 June 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1102-4

zbMATH Keywords

budget balanceenvy-freenessassignment of identical objects

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• Fair imposition
• Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
• Balanced ranking mechanisms
• Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
• Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
• Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Optimal Auction Design
• An Application of the Shapley Value to Fair Division with Money

This page was built for publication: Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects