Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects
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Publication:1638035
DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1102-4zbMath1391.91113OpenAlexW2783101624MaRDI QIDQ1638035
Publication date: 12 June 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1102-4
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Cites Work
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