Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006zbMath1408.91091MaRDI QIDQ460636

Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo

Publication date: 13 October 2014

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism design; payment redistribution; Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

Related Items

Efficient money burning in general domains, Optimal allocation of an indivisible good, Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting, Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget, Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms, An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method, Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects, Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects, Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains, Destroy to save, Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects, Efficiency and Budget Balance, Efficient Money Burning in General Domains

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