Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
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Publication:460636
DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2014.07.006zbMATH Open1408.91091OpenAlexW1965124098MaRDI QIDQ460636FDOQ460636
Authors: Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer 
Publication date: 13 October 2014
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
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- Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
- Redistribution mechanisms for assignment of heterogeneous objects
- Redistribution of VCG payments in public project problems
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- Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
Cited In (19)
- Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
- Destroy to save
- Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
- Efficiency and Budget Balance
- Competitive VCG redistribution mechanism for public project problem
- Efficient money burning in general domains
- Efficient money burning in general domains
- Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
- Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
- An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method
- Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects
- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
- Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
- Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects
- Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
- Redistribution mechanisms for assignment of heterogeneous objects
- Redistribution of VCG payments in public project problems
- Allocative efficiency in simulated multiple-unit combinatorial auctions with quantity support
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