Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2014.07.006zbMATH Open1408.91091OpenAlexW1965124098MaRDI QIDQ460636FDOQ460636

Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo

Publication date: 13 October 2014

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2014.07.006

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designpayment redistributionVickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• Incentives in Teams
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Undominated Groves Mechanisms
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• Competitive auctions
• Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
• Redistribution Mechanisms for Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects
• Redistribution of VCG Payments in Public Project Problems
• Derandomization of auctions
• Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms

Cited In (15)

• Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
• Destroy to save
• Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
• Efficiency and Budget Balance
• Efficient money burning in general domains
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method
• Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects
• Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
• Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
• Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects
• Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
• Allocative efficiency in simulated multiple-unit combinatorial auctions with quantity support
• Efficient Money Burning in General Domains

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