Destroy to save

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.11.002MaRDI QIDQ2016245zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Geoffroy de Clippel, Victor Naroditskiy, Maria Polukarov, Amy Greenwald, Nicholas R. Jennings

Publication date 19 June 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/345503/1/main.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

budget balanceinefficient allocationredistribution mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
• Destroy to save
• Fair imposition
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
• Online mechanisms
• Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
• Redistribution mechanisms for assignment of heterogeneous objects
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions

Cited in

(15)

• A subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing
• Destroy to save
• Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects
• To transfer or to destroy
• A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
• Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
• Efficient money burning in general domains
• Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
• Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution
• Efficient money burning in general domains
• SAVE: Robust or not?
• Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
• Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms
• Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
• Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms

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