Destroy to save
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Publication:2016245
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.11.002zbMATH Open1296.91140OpenAlexW3123636336MaRDI QIDQ2016245FDOQ2016245
Victor Naroditskiy, Geoffroy de Clippel, Nicholas R. Jennings, Maria Polukarov, Amy Greenwald
Publication date: 19 June 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/345503/1/main.pdf
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
- Online mechanisms
- Fair imposition
- Redistribution Mechanisms for Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects
- Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
- Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
- Destroy to save
Cited In (12)
- SAVE: Robust or not?
- Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
- Destroy to save
- To transfer or to destroy
- Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
- Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms
- A subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing
- Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects
- Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
- A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
- Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
- Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution
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