Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343724 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5485440 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5485518 (Why is no real title available?)
- Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy
- Auction design with a risk averse seller
- Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
- Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
- Efficient money burning in general domains
- Frugal path mechanisms
- Frugality in path auctions
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal provision-after-wait in healthcare
- Quasi-proportional mechanisms: prior-free revenue maximization
- Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
Cited in
(3)
This page was built for publication: Efficient money burning in general domains
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q506525)