Efficient money burning in general domains

DOI10.1007/S00224-016-9720-2zbMATH Open1356.91051DBLPjournals/mst/FotakisTTZ16OpenAlexW2547063920WikidataQ59818364 ScholiaQ59818364MaRDI QIDQ506525FDOQ506525

Authors: Dimitris Fotakis, Dimitris Tsipras, Christos Tzamos, Emmanouil Zampetakis 

Publication date: 1 February 2017

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105350

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zbMATH Keywords

social welfaremoney burningalgorithmic mechanism designresidual surplus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal Auction Design
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• Auction design with a risk averse seller
• Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy
• Frugality in path auctions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Efficient money burning in general domains
• Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
• Quasi-proportional mechanisms: prior-free revenue maximization
• Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
• Optimal provision-after-wait in healthcare
• Frugal path mechanisms

Cited In (3)

• How burning money requires a lot of rationality to be effective
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• Money burning in the theory of delegation

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