Efficient money burning in general domains

DOI10.1007/s00224-016-9720-2zbMath1356.91051OpenAlexW2547063920WikidataQ59818364 ScholiaQ59818364MaRDI QIDQ506525

Emmanouil Zampetakis, Dimitris Tsipras, Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos

Publication date: 1 February 2017

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105350

zbMATH Keywords

social welfaremoney burningalgorithmic mechanism designresidual surplus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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