Efficient money burning in general domains
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Publication:506525
DOI10.1007/S00224-016-9720-2zbMATH Open1356.91051DBLPjournals/mst/FotakisTTZ16OpenAlexW2547063920WikidataQ59818364 ScholiaQ59818364MaRDI QIDQ506525FDOQ506525
Authors: Dimitris Fotakis, Dimitris Tsipras, Christos Tzamos, Emmanouil Zampetakis
Publication date: 1 February 2017
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105350
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Cites Work
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- Efficient money burning in general domains
- Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
- Quasi-proportional mechanisms: prior-free revenue maximization
- Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
- Optimal provision-after-wait in healthcare
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