Money burning in the theory of delegation

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.010zbMath1437.91258OpenAlexW2185111827MaRDI QIDQ2173411

Kyle Bagwell, Manuel Amador

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.010

zbMATH Keywords

money burningoptimal delegation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Related Items (2)

Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers ⋮ Resisting persuasion

Cites Work

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• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• A Model of Delegated Project Choice
• The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy
• Optimal Delegation
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Commitment vs. Flexibility

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