What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.02.018MaRDI QIDQ423731zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniele Condorelli

Publication date 4 June 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.018

zbMATH Keywords

lotteriesmechanism designcostly signalspriority lists

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343725 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5485518 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215084 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Coarse Matching
• Coarse matching with incomplete information
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal allocation without transfer payments
• Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
• Properties of Probability Distributions with Monotone Hazard Rate
• Recurrence Relations Between Moments of Order Statistics for Exchangeable Variates
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals

Cited in

(17)

• Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
• Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
• Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
• A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power
• Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2200715 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal delay in committees
• A model of access in the absence of markets
• Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
• Money burning in the theory of delegation
• Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
• Mechanism design with renegotiation and costly messages
• A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation
• Efficient voting with penalties
• Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
• Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction

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