What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.02.018zbMATH Open1239.91111OpenAlexW2053073896MaRDI QIDQ423731FDOQ423731

Authors: Daniele Condorelli 

Publication date: 4 June 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.018

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zbMATH Keywords

lotteriesmechanism designcostly signalspriority lists

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Properties of Probability Distributions with Monotone Hazard Rate
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Coarse matching with incomplete information
• Optimal allocation without transfer payments
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Coarse Matching
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Recurrence Relations Between Moments of Order Statistics for Exchangeable Variates
• Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter

Cited In (17)

• Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
• Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
• Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
• A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power
• Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal delay in committees
• A model of access in the absence of markets
• Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
• Money burning in the theory of delegation
• Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
• Mechanism design with renegotiation and costly messages
• Efficient voting with penalties
• A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation
• Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
• Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction

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