What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.018zbMath1239.91111OpenAlexW2053073896MaRDI QIDQ423731

Daniele Condorelli

Publication date: 4 June 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.018

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designlotteriescostly signalspriority lists

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Related Items (11)

Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions ⋮ A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation ⋮ Delegation and nonmonetary incentives ⋮ Money burning in the theory of delegation ⋮ A Model of Access in the Absence of Markets ⋮ Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget ⋮ Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources ⋮ Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction ⋮ Efficient voting with penalties ⋮ Optimal delay in committees

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Optimal allocation without transfer payments
• Coarse matching with incomplete information
• Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Coarse Matching
• Recurrence Relations Between Moments of Order Statistics for Exchangeable Variates
• Properties of Probability Distributions with Monotone Hazard Rate

This page was built for publication: What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals