Efficient voting with penalties
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Publication:2013363
Recommendations
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- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
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- Voting with rank criterion in the best-choice problem
- A note on the voting problem
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5485518 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 605729 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- An experimental study of storable votes
- An experimental study of voting with costly delay
- Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- Incentives in Teams
- Microeconomic theory
- Multiperson bargaining over two alternatives
- Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
- On the justice of decision rules
- One man, one bid
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal allocation without transfer payments
- Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
- Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
- Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
- Storable votes
- The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
- Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms
- What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals
Cited in
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