Optimal allocation without transfer payments

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.08.006zbMATH Open1274.91261OpenAlexW2152061996WikidataQ57935143 ScholiaQ57935143MaRDI QIDQ380892FDOQ380892

Authors: Surajeet Chakravarty, Todd R. Kaplan 

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://people.exeter.ac.uk/RePEc/dpapers/DP1004.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

allocationmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cited In (15)

• Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
• Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments
• What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals
• Optimal delay in committees
• Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
• Optimal allocations to heterogeneous agents with an application to stimulus checks
• A model of access in the absence of markets
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Money burning in the theory of delegation
• Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
• Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
• Efficient voting with penalties
• Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
• Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction

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