Optimal delay in committees
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2049494
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.008zbMath1470.91080OpenAlexW3180147161MaRDI QIDQ2049494
Wing Suen, Ettore Damiano, Hao Li
Publication date: 25 August 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.008
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