Recommendations
- A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- Payoff equivalence between Bayesian and ex post individually rational dominant strategy mechanisms
- Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies
- Efficiency in correlated equilibrium
Cited in
(13)- Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information
- Debt contracts and cooperative improvements
- The role of commitment in bilateral trade
- Efficiency in correlated equilibrium
- A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies
- Optimal delay in committees
- Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
- Two-sided matching with interdependent values
- Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
- Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
- Signaling, screening, and core stability
- Group stability in matching with interdependent values
- Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem
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