The role of commitment in bilateral trade

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.09.017zbMath1309.91067OpenAlexW3121454525MaRDI QIDQ472223

Lucas Maestri, Johannes Hörner, Dino Gerardi

Publication date: 19 November 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.carloalberto.org/assets/working-papers/no.151.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingmechanism designmarket for lemons

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection ⋮ Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection ⋮ SELLING A LEMON UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY

Cites Work

• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
• A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information
• Veto-based delegation
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
• Posterior efficiency
• Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Bargaining with Interdependent Values
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Optimal Auction Design
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