The role of commitment in bilateral trade

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.09.017MaRDI QIDQ472223zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors D. Gerardi, Johannes Hörner, Lucas Maestri

Publication date 19 November 2014

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.carloalberto.org/assets/working-papers/no.151.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingmechanism designmarket for lemons

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Trade models (91B60)

Recommendations

• Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining
• Bargaining with Interdependent Values
• Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary
• Bargaining with imperfect commitment
• Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488111 (Why is no real title available?)
• A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information
• Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Bargaining with Interdependent Values
• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
• Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
• Game theory
• Optimal Auction Design
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Posterior efficiency
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Veto-based delegation

Cited in

(5)

• The international trade effects of bilateral investment treaties
• Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection
• Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary
• Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection
• Selling a lemon under demand uncertainty

This page was built for publication: The role of commitment in bilateral trade

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q472223)