The role of commitment in bilateral trade

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.09.017zbMATH Open1309.91067OpenAlexW3121454525MaRDI QIDQ472223FDOQ472223

Authors: D. Gerardi, Johannes Hörner, Lucas Maestri 

Publication date: 19 November 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.carloalberto.org/assets/working-papers/no.151.pdf

Recommendations

• Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining
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• Bargaining with imperfect commitment
• Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingmechanism designmarket for lemons

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Trade models (91B60)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Veto-based delegation
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
• Bargaining with Interdependent Values
• A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information
• Posterior efficiency
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade

Cited In (5)

• The international trade effects of bilateral investment treaties
• Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection
• Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary
• Selling a lemon under demand uncertainty
• Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection

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