Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection
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Publication:2682012
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105558zbMath1506.91095OpenAlexW4307568964MaRDI QIDQ2682012
Braz Camargo, Bruno Barsanetti
Publication date: 31 January 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105558
Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
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Cites Work
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