Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection
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Publication:896956
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.04.009zbMATH Open1330.91141OpenAlexW2147808856MaRDI QIDQ896956FDOQ896956
Authors: William Fuchs, Andrzej Skrzypacz 
Publication date: 15 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.009
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Cites Work
- Durable Goods Monopoly with Entry of New Consumers
- Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
- Trading dynamics with adverse selection and search: market freeze, intervention and recovery
- Dynamic signaling and market breakdown
- Waiting for news in the market for lemons
- Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
- Outside and inside liquidity
- Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
- Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection
- Dynamic markets for lemons: performance, liquidity, and policy intervention
- Transparency and price formation
- Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons
- Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
- Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information
- Deregulation with consensus
Cited In (22)
- Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection
- A dynamic theory of bank lending, firm entry, and investment fluctuations
- Selloffs, bailouts, and feedback: can asset markets inform policy?
- Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions
- Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection
- Dynamic markets for lemons: performance, liquidity, and policy intervention
- A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard
- Frictional asset reallocation under adverse selection
- Quality, price, and time-on-market
- On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly
- Comments on: ``Government intervention through informed trading in financial markets
- Government intervention through informed trading in financial markets
- Bubbly bailout
- Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu
- Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection
- The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints
- Trading dynamics with adverse selection and search: market freeze, intervention and recovery
- Market-making with search and information frictions
- Fiscal rules and discretion under limited enforcement
- Make it 'til you fake it
- Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
- Insider trading with penalties
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