On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly
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Publication:894060
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.003zbMath1330.91100OpenAlexW2043137518MaRDI QIDQ894060
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.003
Cites Work
- Competitive bidding with entry costs
- Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining
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- Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection
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- Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
- Calendar mechanisms
- Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
- Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction
- Participation costs and efficient auctions
- Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
- Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
- Costly Signalling in Auctions
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets