On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.03.003zbMATH Open1330.91100OpenAlexW2043137518MaRDI QIDQ894060FDOQ894060

Authors: David McAdams 

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.003

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zbMATH Keywords

entry deterrencedynamic biddingbidding costcommunication costmulti-round auctionpreemptive bid

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Auctions with entry
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• Participation costs and efficient auctions
• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction
• Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining
• Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
• Costly Signalling in Auctions
• Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection
• Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment
• Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
• Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
• Calendar mechanisms

Cited In (2)

• Signaling through entry in auctions with sequential and costly participation
• When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions

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