When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.10.008zbMath1368.91106OpenAlexW2180549988MaRDI QIDQ899502

Paulo Orenstein, Vinicius Carrasco, Pablo Salgado

Publication date: 28 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.008

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsdynamic mechanism designselection proceduredynamic procurementtime-varying private information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
• Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting
• Biased procurement auctions
• Competition for procurement shares
• Selling options
• Sequential Screening
• Durable-Goods Monopoly with Varying Demand
• Efficient Allocations in Dynamic Private Information Economies with Persistent Shocks: A First-Order Approach
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction

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