When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions
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Recommendations
- On optimal bidding in sequential procurement auctions
- Dynamics in non-binding procurement auctions with boundedly rational bidders
- Optimal pricing in iterative flexible combinatorial procurement auctions
- Implementing optimal procurement auctions with exogenous quality.
- On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly
- Dynamic procurement management by reverse auctions with fixed setup costs and sales levers
- Equilibrium strategies in random-demand procurement auctions with sunk costs
- Sequential procurement auctions with risk-averse suppliers
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6452635
- Dynamic procurement from multiple suppliers with random capacities
Cites work
- Biased procurement auctions
- Competition for procurement shares
- Durable-Goods Monopoly with Varying Demand
- Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
- Efficient allocations in dynamic private information economies with persistent shocks: a first-order approach
- Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design and the virtual-pivot mechanism
- Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting
- Selling options
- Sequential screening
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