Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism

DOI10.1287/opre.2013.1194zbMath1291.91082OpenAlexW2109345727MaRDI QIDQ5166250

Ilan Lobel, Sham M. Kakade, Hamid Nazerzadeh

Publication date: 26 June 2014

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/opre.2013.1194

zbMATH Keywords

optimal mechanism designsponsored searchonline advertisingdynamic mechanismsdynamic private information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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